Introduction
Hedge fund activism has become a prominent feature in the corporate landscape over the past few decades. Activist investors, typically hedge funds, acquire stakes in publicly traded companies with the aim of influencing management decisions to increase shareholder value. This form of shareholder activism has generated significant debate among academics, practitioners, and policymakers regarding its impact on corporate performance.
This thesis aims to explore the relationship between hedge fund activism and corporate performance. Specifically, it seeks to analyze whether activist interventions lead to improvements in the financial and operational performance of target companies. By examining the strategies employed by activist investors and the outcomes of their interventions, this study aims to provide insights into the effectiveness of hedge fund activism as a mechanism for corporate governance.
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Background of study
1.3 Problem Statement
1.4 Objective of study
1.5 Limitation of study
1.6 Scope of study
1.7 Significance of study
1.8 Structure of the Thesis
1.9 Definition of terms
Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Overview of Hedge Fund Activism
2.2 Theoretical Framework
2.3 Empirical Studies on Activism and Corporate Performance
2.4 Activist Strategies and Tactics
2.5 Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism
2.6 The Role of Institutional Investors
2.7 Regulatory Environment for Activist Interventions
2.8 Criticisms of Hedge Fund Activism
2.9 Summary of Literature Review
Chapter 3: Research Methodology
3.1 Research Design
3.2 Data Collection
3.3 Sample Selection
3.4 Variables and Measurements
3.5 Data Analysis Techniques
3.6 Hypotheses Development
3.7 Limitations of Methodology
3.8 Ethical Considerations
Chapter 4: Discussion of Findings
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
4.2 Analysis of Activist Interventions
4.3 Impact on Financial Performance
4.4 Impact on Operational Performance
4.5 Comparison of Activist and Non-Activist Companies
4.6 Factors Influencing Activist Success
4.7 Implications for Corporate Governance
4.8 Managerial Implications
4.9 Future Research Directions
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Summary
5.1 Summary of Findings
5.2 Contributions to Literature
5.3 Practical Implications
5.4 Recommendations for Stakeholders
5.5 Conclusion
Thesis Overview:
The Relationship Between Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Performance
Hedge fund activism has emerged as a controversial but influential force in corporate governance. This thesis aims to investigate the impact of activist interventions on the financial and operational performance of target companies. By conducting a comprehensive literature review, analyzing empirical data, and developing hypotheses, this study seeks to provide valuable insights into the relationship between hedge fund activism and corporate performance.
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the research topic, including the background of the study, problem statement, objectives, limitations, scope, significance, structure of the thesis, and definition of terms. Chapter 2 presents a thorough review of the existing literature on hedge fund activism, including theoretical frameworks, empirical studies, activist strategies, corporate governance implications, and regulatory considerations.
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology, including the design, data collection, sample selection, variables, analysis techniques, hypotheses, limitations, and ethical considerations. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study, including descriptive statistics, analysis of activist interventions, impact on financial and operational performance, comparison of activist and non-activist companies, factors influencing activist success, and implications for corporate governance.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings, discussing contributions to the literature, highlighting practical implications for stakeholders, making recommendations, and suggesting directions for future research. Overall, this thesis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on hedge fund activism and its implications for corporate performance.
